CVE-2026-25525

Description

The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (`str_replace('../', '', $input)`) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like `..././` or `....//`, which after the replacement still result in `../`. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem. | Metric | Value | Justification | | ------------------------ | --------- | ------------------------------------- | | Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable via admin panel | | Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | Simple bypass pattern | | Privileges Required (PR) | High | Requires admin authentication | | User Interaction (UI) | None | No additional user interaction needed | | Scope (S) | Unchanged | Impacts the vulnerable component | | Confidentiality (C) | High | Can read sensitive system files | | Integrity (I) | None | Read-only vulnerability | | Availability (A) | None | No impact on availability | ## Affected Products - OpenMage LTS versions < 20.16.1 - All versions derived from Magento 1.x with these code paths ## Affected Files | File | Line | Vulnerable Code | | ------------------------------------------------------------ | ---- | ---------------------------------------- | | `app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Csv.php` | 67 | `str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...))` | | `app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Xml/Excel.php` | 63 | `str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...))` | ## Vulnerability Details The Dataflow module allows administrators to import data from files. The `files` parameter specifies which file to import from the `var/import/` directory. To prevent path traversal, the code uses `str_replace()` to remove `../` sequences: ```php $file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/' . str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files'))); ``` However, `str_replace()` only performs a single pass, making it trivially bypassable: ### Bypass Examples | Input | After `str_replace('../', '', ...)` | Result | | ------------------------------ | ----------------------------------- | --------- | | `..././` | `../` | Bypass | | `....//` | `../` | Bypass | | `..././..././..././etc/passwd` | `../../../etc/passwd` | File read | ### Attack Scenario 1. Attacker gains admin access (via compromised credentials, social engineering, etc.) 2. Navigate to System > Import/Export > Dataflow Profiles 3. Create or modify an import profile 4. Set the `files` parameter to: `..././..././..././etc/passwd` 5. Run the profile to read the contents of `/etc/passwd` ### Proof of Concept ``` # Request to Dataflow with bypass pattern GET /admin/system_convert_gui/run/id/1/?files=..././..././..././etc/passwd # The str_replace removes '../' leaving: # ..././..././..././etc/passwd -> ../../../etc/passwd # Final path resolves to: # /var/www/html/var/import/../../../etc/passwd -> /etc/passwd ``` ## Remediation Replace the weak `str_replace()` filter with `basename()` to extract only the filename: ```php // Before (vulnerable) $file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/' . str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files'))); // After (fixed) $file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/' . basename(urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files'))); ``` Using `basename()` ensures only the filename portion is used, completely preventing any path traversal regardless of the input pattern. ## Workarounds If immediate upgrade is not possible: 1. **Restrict admin access**: Limit Dataflow access to trusted administrators only 2. **Disable Dataflow**: If not in use, disable the Dataflow module entirely 3. **Web Application Firewall**: Block requests containing path traversal patterns 4. **File permissions**: Ensure the web server user has minimal filesystem permissions 5. **Monitor admin activity**: Alert on suspicious Dataflow profile execution ## Impact An attacker with admin access can read sensitive files including: - `/etc/passwd` - System user information - `app/etc/local.xml` - Database credentials - `.env` files - Environment secrets - Log files - Potentially sensitive application data - Configuration files - Server and application configuration ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by [blackhat2013](https://hackerone.com/blackhat2013) through HackerOne. ## Timeline - **2025-12-31**: Vulnerability reported via HackerOne - **2026-01-21**: Fix developed and tested