CVE-2026-44429

Description

## Summary The public catalogue UI served at `GET /` (file `internal/api/handlers/v0/ui_index.html`) is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting via the `server.websiteUrl` field of any published `server.json`. Server-side validation in `internal/validators/validators.go` (`validateWebsiteURL`) only checks that the URL parses, is absolute, and uses the `https` scheme; it does not reject quote characters. Client-side, the value is interpolated into a double-quoted `href` attribute via `innerHTML`, using a homegrown `escapeHtml` helper that performs the standard `textContent` → `innerHTML` round-trip. Per the HTML serialisation algorithm, that round-trip encodes only `&`, `<`, `>` and U+00A0 inside text nodes — it does **not** encode `"` or `'`. A literal `"` in `websiteUrl` therefore breaks out of the `href` attribute, allowing arbitrary `on*` event handlers to be appended to the same `<a>` element. The Content-Security-Policy on `/` is `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.tailwindcss.com`, so the injected event handlers execute. Any user able to obtain a publish token (e.g. via `POST /v0/auth/github-at` with their own GitHub account, or `POST /v0/auth/none` on a deployment that has anonymous auth enabled) can plant a poisoned record visible to every visitor of the registry homepage. ## Affected component - Validator: `internal/validators/validators.go` — `validateWebsiteURL` (lines 153–199) - Sink: `internal/api/handlers/v0/ui_index.html` — `toggleDetails(card, item)` at line 432, the `href` attribute built around `escapeHtml(server.websiteUrl)` - Helper: `escapeHtml` defined at `internal/api/handlers/v0/ui_index.html` lines 494–498 ## Proof of concept 1. Obtain a Registry JWT for any namespace you control (a GitHub OAuth exchange against a throwaway account suffices): ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -sS -X POST https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0/auth/github-at \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"github_token":"<gh-pat>"}' | jq -r .registry_token) ``` 2. Publish a server with a poisoned `websiteUrl`. The literal `"` is preserved end-to-end: ```bash curl -sS -X POST https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0/publish \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ --data-binary @- <<'EOF' { "$schema": "https://static.modelcontextprotocol.io/schemas/2025-09-29/server.schema.json", "name": "io.github.<your-account>/xss-poc", "version": "0.0.1", "description": "hover the website link", "websiteUrl": "https://example.com/\"onmouseover=alert(document.domain)//" } EOF ``` 3. Visit `https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/`, search for `xss-poc`, click the card to expand it, then hover the **Website** link in the details panel. The injected `onmouseover` fires and `alert(document.domain)` runs on the `registry.modelcontextprotocol.io` origin. ## Why server-side validation does not catch this Go's `net/url.Parse` accepts literal `"` in the path component: ``` input="https://example.com/\"onmouseover=alert(1)//" IsAbs=true Scheme="https" Path="/\"onmouseover=alert(1)//" ``` Neither the Huma `format:"uri"` annotation nor `validateWebsiteURL`'s scheme/`IsAbs` triplet rejects this string. The architecture's existing protection — `repository.url` is regex-locked to `^https?://(www\.)?github\.com/[\w.-]+/[\w.-]+/?$` and therefore cannot contain quotes — does not extend to `websiteUrl`, which has no allowlist. ## Why client-side `escapeHtml` does not catch this ```js function escapeHtml(text) { const div = document.createElement('div'); div.textContent = text; return div.innerHTML; } ``` Per the HTML5 spec (§13.3 Serialising HTML fragments), the only characters encoded inside the text content of an element are `&`, `<`, `>`, and U+00A0. `"` and `'` are **not** encoded because in a text-content context they are not special. The helper is therefore safe in element-text contexts (where it is correctly used for `name`, `version`, `description`, etc.) but unsafe inside an attribute value, which is precisely where it is invoked for `href` on lines 432 and 426. ## Impact - Stored XSS on the official MCP Registry homepage. The malicious entry sits in the public catalogue alongside legitimate ones; any user expanding the entry triggers the payload. - Because the page is served on the official `registry.modelcontextprotocol.io` origin, the injected script can: - Read and overwrite `localStorage` (`baseUrl`, `customUrl`), pinning the user's subsequent reads to an attacker-controlled "Custom" base URL. - Issue any same-origin or cross-origin XHR (`connect-src *` is granted). - Phish for Registry JWTs by injecting fake auth flows on the trusted origin. - The CSP `script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.tailwindcss.com` does not block this because `'unsafe-inline'` permits inline event-handler attributes. ## Suggested remediation (any one suffices) 1. Replace the homegrown `escapeHtml` with an attribute-safe encoder that also escapes `"`, `'`, backtick, and `=` — the OWASP HTML attribute-encoding rule. 2. Avoid building the `href` via string templates. Use `setAttribute('href', value)` instead — `setAttribute` is not subject to HTML tokenisation, so no breakout is possible. 3. Tighten `validateWebsiteURL` to reject any URL whose raw bytes contain `"`, `'`, `<`, `>`, ` `, `\t`, or `\n`, or — conservatively — store the canonical re-serialised form (`parsedURL.String()` percent-encodes such characters in the path). 4. Drop `'unsafe-inline'` from `script-src` after auditing the inline scripts on the page. Approach (3) is the smallest server-side change and immediately neutralises the exploit for any new publishes; approaches (1) or (2) close the class of bug at the sink so future fields with similar patterns are safe by default.