CVE-2026-44850

Description

## Summary Portainer offers an environment-level **Disable bind mounts for non-administrators** security setting that blocks regular users from binding host paths into containers they create through the Portainer-mediated Docker API. The check that enforces this setting only inspected the legacy `HostConfig.Binds` array on the container-create proxy and never looked at the equivalent `HostConfig.Mounts` array. Any authenticated user with rights to create containers on a Docker environment where the restriction is enabled could submit a `bind`-typed entry under `HostConfig.Mounts` and mount any host path into their container. The two fields are interchangeable on the Docker daemon — both produce real bind mounts at runtime — so a check that inspects only one is functionally equivalent to no check at all. The same primitive is correctly enforced on Swarm service create against `TaskTemplate.ContainerSpec.Mounts`; the gap was specific to the `POST /containers/create` proxy path. Exploitation requires a regular user with container-create rights on an environment that has the restriction enabled. Such a user can mount any host path read-write or read-only into a container they own and use the resulting view of the host filesystem to read or write anything the Docker daemon's user can — typically `root`. Bind-mount restriction is the primary defence against host filesystem exposure on shared environments where regular users are otherwise permitted to deploy containers. ## Severity **High** The vulnerability is exploitable over the network with low attack complexity, no attack requirement, and no user interaction. It requires a low-privilege authenticated session — any regular user with container-create rights on an environment where the bind-mount restriction is enabled. The vulnerable system (the Portainer container-create proxy) suffers a confidentiality and integrity breach by virtue of the bypass itself, but the dominant impact is on the subsequent system: the Docker host's filesystem and any container running alongside the attacker's. This is a restriction bypass rather than a cross-authority escalation — the user already had container-create rights, and the bind-mount restriction is a defence-in-depth control on top of that capability — which is the reason the rating is held at High rather than promoted to Critical despite the host-level reach. ## Affected Versions The vulnerability has existed since the `AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers` security setting was introduced. The `HostConfig.Mounts` field has never been inspected by the container-create proxy on any release line. Fixes are included in the following releases: | Branch | First vulnerable | Fixed in | |--------------|------------------|------------| | 2.33.x (LTS) | 2.33.0 | **2.33.8** | | 2.39.x (LTS) | 2.39.0 | **2.39.2** | | 2.41.x (STS) | all prior | **2.41.0** | Portainer releases prior to 2.33.0 are end-of-life and will not receive a fix. Users on EOL versions should upgrade to a supported LTS branch. ## Workarounds Administrators who cannot immediately upgrade can reduce exposure by: - **Revoke container-create rights from non-administrator accounts on affected environments.** If the bind-mount restriction is being relied on as a hard guarantee, audit which non-administrator accounts have container-create rights on environments where it is set, and downgrade those accounts to roles that lack container-create until the patched release is deployed. Stack and service deployment that depends on container-create will stop working for those users until the patched release is in place. - **Audit recent container creations for `HostConfig.Mounts` of `Type: bind` from non-admin Portainer users.** Inspect Docker daemon logs and `docker inspect` output on affected environments. Any non-admin-created container with a bind-typed `Mounts` entry should be treated as a potential incident. - **Segregate tenants by environment.** Where the per-environment toggle was being used to share an environment between tenants of different trust levels, splitting the workloads onto separate environments is a stronger control than the toggle and remains in place after upgrade. None of these replace the fix. ## Affected Code The enforcement lives in `decorateContainerCreationOperation` in `package/server-ce/api/http/proxy/factory/docker/containers.go`. The `PartialContainer` struct used to deserialise the request body for inspection only contained `HostConfig.Binds`: ``` // package/server-ce/api/http/proxy/factory/docker/containers.go type PartialContainer struct { HostConfig struct { Privileged bool `json:"Privileged"` PidMode string `json:"PidMode"` Devices []any `json:"Devices"` Sysctls map[string]any `json:"Sysctls"` CapAdd []string `json:"CapAdd"` CapDrop []string `json:"CapDrop"` Binds []string `json:"Binds"` } `json:"HostConfig"` } if !securitySettings.AllowBindMountsForRegularUsers && len(partialContainer.HostConfig.Binds) > 0 { for _, bind := range partialContainer.HostConfig.Binds { if strings.HasPrefix(bind, "/") { return forbiddenResponse, ErrBindMountsForbidden } } } ``` The fix adds a `Mounts` field to `PartialContainer` and a parallel check that rejects any entry whose `Type` equals `bind`, mirroring the existing logic on the Swarm service-create proxy. The container-update path is unaffected — the Docker daemon does not accept mount changes via container update — and Swarm service create was already covered. Compose-stack deployment is not in scope of this advisory; the bind-mount restriction is a daemon-mediated container-create control, and Compose deployment runs Docker through a separate path that is not currently subject to the same restriction. The same change applies cleanly on each LTS branch — the surrounding code shape on `release/2.33` and `release/2.39` is identical to develop on the points the patch touches, so the LTS backports are byte-equivalent additions of the `Mounts` field and the parallel check. ## Impact A regular user who has been explicitly restricted from using bind mounts can bypass the restriction and: - **Read or write any path on the Docker host filesystem.** The mount runs as the daemon user (typically `root`), so any path is reachable. Sensitive examples include `/etc/shadow`, host SSH keys under `/root/.ssh` and `/home/*/.ssh`, and TLS material under `/etc/docker`. - **Compromise other containers on the same host.** The host's `/var/lib/docker` (or equivalent) is reachable from within the bound mount, exposing the layers, volumes, and live state of every container the daemon manages. - **Reach the Docker socket.** Mounting `/var/run/docker.sock` into the attacker's container hands them full Docker API access on the host, regardless of any authorisation enforced by Portainer above the proxy. - **Write persistence to the host.** Without `ReadOnly`, the attacker can drop SSH keys into `authorized_keys`, install systemd units, or modify cron, achieving persistence outside of any container the daemon supervises. The bind-mount restriction was the primary defence against this class of host exposure for non-administrator container creators; bypassing it removes the only enforcement point above the daemon for tenants who were granted container-create rights. ## Timeline - 2026-03-04: Reported via GitHub Security Advisory by **offensiveee** (Assaf Alassaf). - 2026-03-04 – 2026-04-17: Six further independent reports of the same primitive received via GitHub Security Advisory (alexwaira, ffulbtech, Proscan-one, jeroengui, AyushParkara, marduc812) and consolidated against this advisory. - 2026-04-18: Fix merged to `develop`. - 2026-06-04: Backports merged to `release/2.33` and `release/2.39`. - 2026-04-29: 2.41.0 released with fix. - 2026-05-07: 2.33.8, 2.39.2, released with fix. ## Credit - **offensiveee** (Assaf Alassaf) — initial report identifying the `HostConfig.Mounts` bypass on container create and the divergence from the Swarm service-create check. - **alexwaira** — independently reported the same `HostConfig.Mounts` bypass on container create. - **ffulbtech** — independently reported the same `HostConfig.Mounts` bypass on container create. - **Proscan-one** — independently reported the same `HostConfig.Mounts` bypass on container create. - **jeroengui** — independently reported the same `HostConfig.Mounts` bypass on container create. - **AyushParkara** — independently reported the same `HostConfig.Mounts` bypass on container create. - **marduc812** — independently reported the same `HostConfig.Mounts` bypass on container create.